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Abstract: This paper examines the metamorphosis of Nigeria‘s foreign policy from its 
traditional posture of a responsible nation in the international community, to a reckless 
player under the military between 1993 and 1999. Nigeria‘s reputation as a respectable 
state diminished under the Abacha regime, whose tyranny led to multiple violations of 
human rights and breaches of international moral and legal codes. This infamous 
posture eroded Nigeria‘s track record of provision of regional and global leadership. Its 
mineral and oil wealth had naturally imposed extra burdens of leadership in the 
continent of Africa and the world. The paper critically appraises this significant 
transition and departure from traditional foreign policy posture and international image 
during the Abacha era; and using the decision-making model of analysis, it discovers 
that with the Abacha intervention, a new chapter of domestic travails (anti-democracy 
activities, state-sponsored terrorism, poor human rights records, large-scale corruption 
and financial crimes, and the creation of artificial insulation against the world), coupled 
with an unorthodox manner of dealing with the international community commenced, 
which clouded the good image of the past.  Nigeria thus got alienated in the global 
system. This paper identifies the pacifist role of the successive Abubakar regime, but 
submits that despite that approach, the grey areas such as the sudden death of Chief 
MKO Abiola (winner of the June 12 presidential elections) in his (Abubakar‘s custody), 
did not allow for a complete restoration of Nigeria‘s golden era of internationalism. 
Both regimes had thus bequeathed to the nation an unorthodox foreign policy and an 
unusual image, a development that compels a curious enquiry. The paper adopts a 
theoretical approach and relies exclusively on secondary data for analysis.  
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Introduction 
On November 17, 1993 when 
General Sani Abacha took over from 
the Interim National Government led 
by Chief Ernest Sonekan, he took a 
number of measures that were 
clearly antediluvian in an age of 
globalized democracy. His 
dissolution of democratic structures 
and institutions, adoption of full 
martial laws and assumption of 
sweeping powers, massive arrests 
and detention of political opposition, 
clampdown on the press and hunting 
of the winner of the June 12 election 
after the latter‘s Epetedo (Lagos) 
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Declaration as President, 
demonstrated a clear disinterest in 
resolving the 1993 presidential 
election crises or stabilizing an 
already pulverized polity. The 
Abacha administration itself was not 
only a child of circumstance, but was 
also the main beneficiary of 
Nigeria‘s protracted political logjam 
following the annulment of the 
popularly acclaimed free and fair 
presidential elections that had 
produced Chief Abiola as the winner. 
This crisis, coupled with Abacha‘s 
anti-democratic posture from the 
start opened the floodgate of 
problems for Nigeria‘s image abroad 
and undermined its respect in the 
international community.  
 
Nigeria had suffered some image 
problems in the immediate past. 
These had included the Britain-
Nigeria misunderstanding over the 
Umaru Dikko kidnap affair (Fawole, 
1999), the Billy Eko and Gloria 
Okon drug peddling scandals to 
which erstwhile President Ibrahim 
Babangida was linked, corruption 
and advanced fee fraud (419) and 
Babangida‘s endless transition 
programme (Akinterinwa, 2001). 
However the gross human rights 
abuse, ridiculous transition to civil 
rule program under General Abacha 
and many instances of diplomatic 
failures in management of the image 
problem fuelled the collective 
western condemnation and 
accentuated the resolve to dismantle 
the military fortress in Nigeria‘s 
political capital. The highpoint of the 
regime‘s blunders was the 
negligence of global plea for 
clemency in the death sentence 
passed on the Ogoni environmental 
rights leaders, their subsequent 
hanging and alleged sponsorship of 
assassinations of perceived political 
enemies (Saliu, 1996).  
 
The hostile domestic environment 
was expectedly going to drive the 
investors away and keep potential 
investors at a safe distance from 
Nigeria. Thus Abacha‘s style created 
a policy conundrum that made him 
lose popularity both at home and 
abroad. In such circumstance brute 
force always is likely the state art of 
dictatorship and this was exactly the 
recourse of the Abacha regime 
(Mbang, 1997: 6).  
 
The immediate response of the 
international community to the 
execution of the Ogoni leaders 
strategy of the international 
community was to isolate Nigeria. 
The Canadian government closed its 
high commission in Nigeria, South 
Africa severed ties with Abacha‘s 
government and the American and 
British authorities imposed full 
military and limited economic 
sanctions in order to frustrate and, in 
the process, compel the military 
government to change its unpopular 
style of administration.  
 
General Abdulsalami Abubakar 
contended with a most battered 
Nigerian international image, an 
isolated country and a messy foreign 
policy from 1998 on assumption of 
power after the sudden death of 
General Abacha. Abubakar‘s quest 
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to launder Nigeria‘s image abroad 
and renounce the pariah status, made 
his administration to adopt a foreign 
policy of retreat. He changed the 
combative nature of the previous 
administration in the utilization of 
instruments of policy to attract 
foreign pardon and sympathy 
towards Nigeria. Some authorities in 
foreign policy, including Ojo and 
Azeez (2002:216-17) have argued 
that this was meant to reintegrate 
Nigeria in the comity of nations. The 
whole essence of reintegration 
strategies was to bring Nigeria back 
into the mainstream of the global 
capitalist economy after a long 
absence (Saliu, 1999: 236). 
Abdulsalami‘s approach was 
however too pacifist and rather than 
restore Nigeria in the old 
uncompromising enviable position, it 
demeaned the country as Nigeria had 
always occupied a dignified position 
in global politics, not at all appearing 
beggarly.  
 
These are the compelling factors 
according relevance and import to 
this paper. It examines the reaction 
and retreat in the foreign policy of a 
nation that had a long-range policy 
target to assume leadership position 
like the United States, in the world. 
The paper is thematically structured 
to take a full stock of the issues 
pivotal to the policy conundrum at 
the external level.  
 
Theoretical and Conceptual 
Analysis 
The foreign policy making and 
action of Abacha and Abdulsalami, 
like that of any other‘s are matters of 
rational or irrational decisions and 
calculations, with the primary 
objective of maximizing gains or 
recording minimal losses in 
international politics (Ogwu and 
Olukoshi, 2002: 17-18). Rational 
decision making model captures the 
essence of the arguments in the paper 
and hence will be the binoculars to 
look at issues and scale to measure 
the decisions and actions of the state 
in the global system during our 
period.  
 
Decision-makers, out of a list of 
alternatives, calculate the cost and 
benefits of taking a certain course of 
action. They reach a decision by 
choosing the alternatives with the 
highest benefits and the lowest costs. 
The term ‗rationality‘ relates to how 
decision-making entails purposeful, 
goal–directed behaviour that is 
exhibited when the individual is 
responding to an international event 
using the best information available 
and chooses from pool of possible 
responses that are most likely to 
maximize his goals (Verba, 1969 as 
cited in Kegley & Wittkopf, 1989). 
Decision-makers tend to attach 
probabilities to the possible outcome 
of an action as a result of the 
uncertainties in terms of the cost and 
benefits of taking such action. 
However it is necessary to note that 
while some decision-makers accept 
risks others are prone to averting 
risks.  
 
Rational decision-making is done 
through a sequence of steps: 
1. Problem recognition: This 
marks the beginning of the 
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decision-making process. 
Decision-makers perceive the 
existence of a problem, 
which they must deal with 
based on the accuracy of the 
information available. 
Accuracy here means the 
information required for 
dealing with the problem 
must be readily available; 
information about the 
‗actions, motivations, and 
capabilities of other actors ‘, 
the international system 
inclusive. (Kegley & 
Wittkopf, 1989: 38). 
2. Goal selection: Policy makers 
determine the rationale for 
resolving the problem. 
Hence, all identified goals are 
arranged in order of 
preference. 
3. Identification of alternatives: 
A list of alternatives (policy 
options) is made available 
with the calculated cost and 
benefit of choosing each 
policy option. 
4. Choice: Based on the cost-
benefit analysis conducted 
for each policy option, the 
alternative that is, the policy 
option that addresses the 
problem is selected.  
 
According to Rosenau, 
  
no framework has energized 
inquiry in foreign policy as 
Rostow‘s theory of the   
economic growth did in the 
economic development field, 
as Festinger‘s theory of 
cognitive dissonance did in 
social psychology or as 
Almond‘s functional model 
did in comparative politics, as 
rational decision making 
(1980: 119) 
 
Like all theories, the rational 
decision-making theory has its own 
shortcomings as well. The rational 
decision-making model is shrouded 
in uncertainties, ranging from the 
effect of events on the international 
scene on decision-making and 
multiple goals of decision-makers. 
Certain factors impinge on decision-
makers‘ capacity to make decisions, 
such as the fact that decisions are 
reached in a group context, that is 
agreement is required before a 
decision is arrived at. Problem 
definition because of lack of 
information is often delayed, while 
information that is available is often 
inaccurate. Goal selection on the 
other hand, poses some difficulty 
because of the ambiguities in 
defining what national interest is. At 
the choice phase, decision makers 
engage in what Herbert A. Simon 
(1982) refers to as ‗satisficing‘ 
behaviour that involves, selecting the 
choice that meets minimally 
acceptable standards in place of 
optimal alternatives. 
 
Closely related to the above is the 
difference between theory and 
practice. The ideal process of 
rational decision making involves 
accurate and comprehensive 
information about the problem, clear 
identification of goals, analysis of 
options, choosing the most favorable 
alternative based on a rational 
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decision criteria and an evaluation of 
the consequences of selecting the 
policy option followed by measure 
aimed at correcting errors. In actual 
practice however, information about 
the problem is often distorted, 
individual interests bias national 
interest, policy options available are 
limited, selection is done by political 
bargaining and compromise, 
superficial evaluation and delayed 
correction of errors (Kegley & 
Wittkopf, 1989: 38). 
 
Against the backdrop of the rational 
decision making model, the paper 
determines what points the Nigerian 
foreign policy  process was rational 
or irrational, particularly as major 
and crucial decisions were expected 
at critical junctures between 1993 
and 1998, and from then to now. The 
foreign policy terrain of Nigeria at 
the earlier points was delicate and 
intricately interesting, with critical 
moments at the domestic level 
capable of turning the international 
community against the country. It is 
pertinent to note that the situation at 
the time is a fundamental example of 
the important place of the domestic 
environment in shaping a nation‘s 
foreign policy. 
 
The Abacha years were the most 
irrational in foreign policy decision-
making in the chequered history of 
Nigeria. The domestic environment 
of the foreign policy process was 
characterized by a ruthless manner of 
handling perceived and real 
opposition to the government, which 
attracted western and global concern, 
and Abacha‘s prompt use of 
aggression to challenge what he 
considered undue external 
interference in the country. For the 
five years he ruled therefore, 
Nigeria‘s foreign policy was 
essentially aggressive. 
 
The Abacha years were the most 
irrational in foreign policy decision-
making in the chequered history of 
Nigeria. The domestic environment 
of the foreign policy process was 
characterized by a ruthless manner of 
handling perceived and real 
opposition to the government, which 
attracted western and global concern, 
and Abacha‘s prompt use of 
aggression to challenge what he 
considered undue external 
interference in the country. For the 
five years he ruled therefore, 
Nigeria‘s foreign policy was 
essentially aggressive. 
 
Abdusalami‘s pacifist foreign policy, 
on the other hand, represented a 
descent of Nigeria‘s glory that 
characterized the time. It was the 
highpoint of a weakened power that 
had also lost its goodwill and 
demanded a modicum of legitimacy 
in the comity of nations.  
 
Foreign Policy Decision-Making: 
The Person, the Process and 
Nigeria’s Pedigree 
As a pattern of behavior that one 
state adopts in relating with other 
states and as the strategy and tactics 
employed by the state in its relation 
with other states in the international 
system, foreign policy thus connotes 
for Ojo and Sesay (2002) a plan or 
programme of actions of a state, 
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which determines the sum-total of 
the state‘s objectives in the 
international system. In this sense, 
therefore, national interest deals with 
the state desires and the definition of 
the most effective means to go about 
it. 
 
In the process of making foreign 
policies, or at the stage of initiating 
policy objectives, certain factors are 
considered. These factors naturally 
condition the foreign policy of a 
state, and are standards that policy 
makers use to measure policy aims. 
Aside considering the factors, 
including leadership style, pattern 
and orientations; the geography is 
taken into consideration as well. All 
these variables, and external ones, 
including what is at stake for the 
country in relating with a state or 
more states, essentially determine the 
national interest. 
 
Also, policy makers assess 
prevailing interest within domestic 
society with a view to determining 
what constitutes national interest: 
providing national security, 
protecting national prestige, 
maintaining state integrity and 
promoting economic interest. In the 
conducting of foreign policy affairs, 
and the uses of foreign policy, Hans 
Morgenthau (1973), identifies the 
individual(s) who are behind such 
affairs, and calls them the power of 
the foreign policy of a nation. For 
him, the foreign policy of any nation 
is the foreign policy of certain 
individuals who belong to the same 
nation. Morgenthau echoes Marcel 
Proust who says: 
 
The life of nations merely 
repeats, on a larger scale, the 
lives of their component cells; 
and he who is incapable of 
understanding the mystery, the 
reactions, the law that 
determine the movement of the 
individual, never hopes to say 
anything worth listening to 
about  the struggles of nations 
(Proust, 1971).. 
The analysis by Morgenthau and 
Proust reinforces the fact that 
national interest, in most cases, is the 
product of individual‘s personal 
ideas, ideologies and interest, and the 
success or failure of foreign policy is 
not usually a result of weakness of 
the nation, but more as a 
consequence of the far- or short-
sightedness of the men behind the 
policy process. The foreign policy 
failure of Nigeria and its posture of a 
weakling under Abacha and 
Abdulsalami respectively were 
indeed the failures of them as a 
person.  
 
What Morgenthau considers as 
elements of national power, such as 
advantage or disadvantage of 
geography, natural resources, 
industrial capacity, military 
preparedness, population size and 
resourcefulness, national character, 
national morale, quality of society, 
quality of diplomacy and quality of 
leadership of government; also 
constitute essential domestic 
determinants of foreign policy aims, 
efficacy, richness and consistency. 
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Leadership matters most, because it 
is the institution that will identify the 
national potentials, harness them and 
make a balance between the 
resources and policy, and among the 
resources. For, as Morgenthau 
(1973) puts it,  
 
a government must choose 
the objectives and methods 
of its foreign policy in view 
of the power available to 
support them with a 
maximum chance of   
success. A nation that sets 
its sights too low, foregoing 
foreign policies will within 
the reach of its power, 
abdicate its rightful role in 
the council of nations 
(Morgenthau, 1973). 
 
Thus, national power determines the 
limit of foreign policy. But there is 
an exception to the rule, and that is 
when the very existence of the nation 
is at stake. Then, Morgenthau posits, 
―the policy of national survival 
overrides the rational considerations 
of national power‖. 
 
What this implies is that foreign 
policy may not necessarily mind the 
pulse of the masses. Alexis de 
Tocqueville (1945) in On American 
Democracy where he narrated how 
George Washington‘s policy of 
declaring war against England in 
1776 was reprobated by the majority 
in America but still went ahead with 
it , posits that popular support or 
opposition may not necessarily count 
in the execution of foreign policy. 
The statesman must think in terms of 
national interest, conceived as 
powers among nations. Government 
must resist the temptation to sacrifice 
what it considers good policy upon 
the altar of public opinion. The 
government is the leader of the 
public opinions and is therefore not 
expected to be goaded and misled by 
the whimsical opinions of the masses 
in matters of foreign policy. 
 
Foreign policy, like any other policy, 
is beset with the lacuna of social 
theory in political practice. 
According to Brain Fay (1996) 
policies are not always executed the 
way they are set out, there is a 
missing link between a positivist 
theory of social knowledge and a 
social engineering conception of 
political practice. He therefore 
advocates what he calls policy 
science in policy process to achieve 
the best result. He describes policy 
science as ―that set of procedures 
which enables one to determine the 
technically best course of action to 
adopt in order to implement a 
decision or achieve a goal.‖ 
 
The ‗policy engineer‘ in the context 
above is one who seeks the most 
technically correct answer to 
political problems in terms of 
available social scientific knowledge. 
In terms of foreign policy, the 
engineers are in most cases, the head 
of state, foreign affairs secretary or 
minister as the case may be, and 
personnel at the foreign ministry, 
members of the National Assembly, 
diplomats and diplomatic missions, 
ambassadors and representatives of a 
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nation at sub-regional and global 
organizations. 
 
Foreign policy is used in many ways. 
It is generally a tool for a nation to 
relate with its contemporaries in the 
international system of states. It is 
used in such a way that a nation will 
benefit from the system, a fact that 
national interest dictates the nature 
and aims of foreign policy. Foreign 
policy is a strategy by a nation to 
maximize profits and record 
minimum losses in the global system 
(Nwolise, 1993). While a country‘s 
foreign policy should be in tandem 
with the general principles governing 
international relations, including 
international law, international 
morality, etc., it still essentially 
remains an instrument of 
international muscle-flexing in most 
cases. The foreign policies of Great 
Britain, France and Germany for 
instance, remained, for a long time, 
those utilized for establishing 
political, economic and cultural 
hegemony over the rest of the globe. 
This explains their expansionist 
policy of colonialism ab initio. 
 
Some foreign policies, on the other 
hand have been servile ones, which 
have either been parasitic, lacking in 
ideological focus and dependent on 
the ex-metropoles. Conversely, 
dynamic Third World foreign 
policies have tended to establish the 
economic independence of their 
countries in the international system 
of unequal socio-political and 
economic relations. Countries with 
aggressive foreign policy objectives, 
history has shown, use their foreign 
policies to enhance their economic 
development and better the lot of 
their citizens. As a strategy, Mercado 
(1995:107-27) notes,  
  
Patriotic leaders practically 
apply the foreign policies 
of their nations 
strategically to   pursue the 
economic development of 
their states as a priority 
objective of the of foreign 
policy. In this way, they 
progressively transform 
their technology, 
environment, industry and, 
advance their people‘s 
living standard (Mercad.o, 
1995). 
 
An undynamic and unfocussed 
foreign policy will bring a nation to 
its knees in the face of pressures 
from economic predators. For 
instance, when Nigeria sought 
Western technocrats during the civil 
war, it became tied to their aprons: 
Britain enjoying 31%, West 
Germany 30%, and the Netherlands 
13% of its exports in raw materials, 
including crude, while these 
countries supplied it with 70 of it 
imports, all in cheap finished 
products (Nwolise, and Akpotor, 
1999). 
 
Nigeria‘s foreign policy, for several 
decades, has been fantastic on paper, 
but when critically reflected on, is 
vague, nebulous and outlandish. The 
policy engineers have, particularly 
under military rule, been ―father-
Christmassy‖ and exhibited a lack of 
understanding of foreign policy 
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substance, ideology and direction. 
From independence, Nigeria‘s policy 
has been geared towards the pursuit 
of either political goals, international 
recognition as the giant of Africa, or 
attraction of foreign aid. No wonder, 
Ike Nwachukwu), former External 
Affairs Minister, said that Nigeria‘s 
foreign policy 
                                 
 should reflect our 
changing national 
circumstances as well as 
adapt to the realities of a 
rapidly changing 
international environment 
…Indeed, considering 
Nigeria‘s present 
circumstances, economic 
issues have acquired added 
significance and should in 
any view be given priority 
attention in our foreign 
policy (Nwachukwu, 
1988). 
 
Nigeria‘s use of foreign policy on the 
African scene is reminiscent of 
Morgenthau‘s postulation that 
foreign policy is all about national 
power, power being the major tool in 
the struggle for the minds of men, 
the struggle which translates into 
foreign policy. For Nigeria, policy is 
the veritable instrument of 
swaggering its political power and 
political influence in Africa. Its 
policy earns less of military and 
economic power, but earns the 
country the image the military, 
economic and political giant of 
Africa. This makes it to have that 
‗father Christmas‘ disposition 
towards any ‗needy‘ African nation. 
 
Like the French foreign policy was at 
a time, the promotion of foreign 
economic investment is glaringly 
absent in Nigeria‘s policy, but there 
is the glorification of the pursuit of 
international status, prestige, 
grandeur and largely, especially 
under military rule, the preservation 
and maintenance of the regime in 
power (Otubanjo, et al, 1985)  
 
The uses of foreign policy thus falls 
within four broad categories namely: 
national self-preservation, that is the 
pursuing of policies for the 
maintenance of existing values like 
national independence; territorial 
integrity of regime in power, etc; 
national self-extension, that is, 
furthering policies aimed at 
achieving external values such as 
national economic development: and 
self-abnegation, which connotes 
pursuit of policies meant to achieve 
international peace and solidarity. 
For most of the period of its 40 years 
of existence, Nigeria falls within the 
first and the last categories. 
 
While changes in course and 
character have occurred till date, the 
standard principle of Nigeria‘s 
foreign policy has however remained 
the same. They are the principles of 
dignity of states, non-interference in 
the local affairs of other states, self 
determination of peoples under any 
form of colonial or racist rule, good 
neighborliness with other countries 
and a drive towards African unity 
(Adeniran, 1989:31-34; Okolo, 
1989). 
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In the evolution of the Nigerian post-
colonial foreign policy, the Tafawa 
Balewa administration exercised 
greater hesitancy and uncertainty 
regarding international issues and 
tended to be pro-West. Being a 
member of the Monrovia Group, 
which advocated a cautious, gradual 
and pragmatic approach to African 
unity, Nigeria‘s foreign policy 
tended to lack the kind of dynamism 
expected of that time, as it even went 
ahead to sign a defense pact with 
Britain in 1962. However, the 
Balewa government still made 
strides, prevailing on the 
Commonwealth to expel apartheid 
South Africa, and breaking ties with 
France for its nuclear test in Western 
Sahara. Nigeria also joined the Non-
Aligned Movement in the heat of the 
Cold War, in order not to take sides 
with any of the two conflicting 
ideological blocs namely, the 
Capitalist West and the Socialist East 
(Aluko, 1981) 
 
Gowon‘s foreign policy was 
conditioned by the civil war of 1967-
70. The discovery of oil brought 
Nigeria to greater international 
limelight. Nigeria placed much 
emphasis on Africa as evident in the 
emergence of regional and bilateral 
bodies as the ECOWAS, Chad Basin 
Commission and Niger Basin 
Commission. It also recognized the 
state of China despite the Western 
opposition and from the civil war 
began to maintain a balanced 
relationship with the Western and 
Soviet blocs, and exhibited concern 
for Africans in the Diaspora. 
 
Murtala-Obasanjo‘s era witnessed a 
more dynamic foreign policy. It 
nationalized the British Petroleum 
(BP) for the purposes of compelling 
the British in Rhodesia to accept 
negotiation with liberation 
movements there and make them set 
the path for Zimbabwe‘s quick 
independence. Nigeria also 
recognized the MPLA as the 
legitimate government of Angola, 
against America‘s President Ford‘s 
persuasion that African leaders 
should disregard the leftist 
government of the MPLA (Aluko, 
1981; Fawole, 2000). 
 
Nigeria lost its reputation as a 
Frontline state fighting against 
apartheid in South Africa during the 
Shagari regime, and the Buhari-
Idiagbon era ushered in an 
aggressive anti-drug and anti-
corruption policy to brighten the 
country‘s foreign policy and image 
prospects. 
 
By and large, Nigeria‘s foreign 
policy principle remained the same, 
with the ultimate concern of 
transforming the country into a 
political giant relevant in an African 
peace and development. 
 
Abacha’s Policy Conundrum 
In June 1993 Nigeria‘s military, led 
by General Ibrahim Babangida, 
annulled election results, thereby 
blocking the inauguration of the 
country‘s first civilian president in a 
decade. International observers had 
declared that the election of 
Moshood Abiola was ―free and fair‖ 
and the U.S. Congress had passed a 
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resolution recognizing its legitimacy. 
In prodemocracy protests that ensued 
several hundred demonstrators were 
killed. The military coup  of 
November 1993 and repression 
angered the U.S. (along with the rest 
of the world), which viewed Nigeria 
as both a reliable political ally and an 
economic powerhouse in Africa. The 
crisis confirmed widespread 
suspicion that Nigeria‘s military elite 
was unwilling to relinquish power to 
a democratically elected civilian 
government. The Clinton 
administration quickly condemned 
the Nigerian military‘s action and 
proposed limited diplomatic and 
economic sanctions. By the time 
General Abacha seized power in 
November 1993, Washington had 
canceled the visas of important 
military personnel, restricted arms 
sales, halted all U.S. economic and 
military aid, and cut off Nigeria‘s 
access to trade credits and guarantees 
(Fadope, 1997). Abacha had shot 
himself to power on the heels of the 
illegitimacy of the Interim National 
Government, headed by Earnest 
Shonekan. That council was 
generally regarded as illegitimate, 
weak, slow and incapable of 
arresting the socio-economic and 
political crisis of his time (Eragbe, 
1997). Pro-democracy activists had 
gone to court to seek an injunction 
declaring the administration illegal 
and unfit a premise subsequently for 
the intervention of General Abacha 
on November 17, 1993 (Obi, 1997).      
 
Despite the initial sanctions and 
diplomatic face-off with the U.S. and 
international community designed to 
persuade the Abacha regime to 
return to the democratic process, 
political and human rights steadily 
deteriorated. General Abacha ruled 
by military decrees and effectively 
neutralized all political opposition. 
Abiola was arrested, thousands of 
labor leaders, prodemocracy and 
human rights activists, and other 
opponents were jailed, and many 
others, including protesters were 
killed. The state secret terror squad, 
Abacha‘s Strike Force led by 
Barnabas Msheila assassinated the 
ruler‘s perceived and real political 
enemies in the ever growing camp of 
the pro-democracy activists (Fadope, 
1997). 
 
Abacha had disbanded all democratic 
institutions, including the electoral 
body and the National and State 
Houses of Assembly, and sacked all 
the federal and state cabinets. While 
he ignored the June 12 issue which 
had attracted the military sanctions 
from the West, a new democratic 
agenda or transitional programme 
was not even put up, except nebulous 
statements on a planned new 
transition, which would be centered 
on the outcome of a proposed 
constitutional conference. 
 
Abacha‘s broadcast on November 17 
met resentment of the local and 
international publics. Violence in the 
cities of Ibadan and Lagos, and other 
major towns prompted London and 
Western financial institutions to 
begin to reconsider its relationship 
with the Nigerian military 
government. According to them, 
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only the quick return of Nigeria to 
democracy could elicit a smooth 
relationship with the country once 
again. The junta made a volte-face, 
and sought how to realign with 
another part of the international 
community in the course of 
overcoming the opposition from pro-
democracy groups (Lovgren, 1998). 
 
However, Nigerians and the world 
were no longer sure Abacha wanted 
Nigeria returned to democracy. 
Abacha was not upholding his 
commitment to change Nigeria's 
government from a military regime 
to a democracy by 1998. Abacha's 
failure to meet the deadlines of his 
first three-year reform program 
demonstrated that the government 
was not capable of making the 
transition on time. Abacha's 
exclusion of all political parties and 
individuals that did not support him 
as the future president showed that 
the regime was not committed to 
democracy (Onadipe, 1997).  
 
The restlessness of the world, 
particularly the U.S. over happenings 
in Nigeria was not far from the 
prognosis; there was a mix of 
political, economic and moral 
factors. Nigeria, Africa‘s largest and 
most populous country (more than 
140 million), is one of the U.S.‘s 
largest trading partners in Africa and 
the world‘s ninth largest oil 
producer. When Nigeria became 
independent from Britain in 1960, its 
size, natural resource wealth, and 
well-educated leadership positioned 
it as a regional power in West Africa. 
As a member of the Non-Aligned 
Movement, Nigeria never officially 
sided with the U.S., but its foreign 
policies and UN votes did not 
contradict American interests. The 
U.S. welcomed Nigeria‘s political 
moderation, encouraged its regional 
prowess, and tolerated a string of 
military governments, punctuated by 
brief intervals of civilian rule. 
Together with Britain, U.S. military 
assistance and arms sales helped 
equip Nigeria‘s army, the largest in 
Africa. Except for the Biafran civil 
war (1967-70), Nigeria had been 
relatively stable and it was just 
proper for the U.S. to secure its 
biggest trading partner in Africa 
from possible disintegration. Despite 
tough words and some concrete 
diplomatic and economic measures, 
the Clinton administration and 
Congress refused imposing oil 
sanctions, the one move that could 
quickly force the military 
dictatorship to capitulate. The U.S. 
had continued to purchase over a half 
million barrels of Nigerian oil a day. 
This equals 8% of total U.S. oil 
imports—just under what the U.S. 
buys from the entire Middle East. Oil 
kept the military in power: 90% of 
Nigeria‘s foreign revenues come 
from oil exports. The U.S. buys 44% 
of Nigeria‘s oil and four U.S. oil 
companies are drilling in Nigeria 
(Fadope, 1997). This was an instance 
of the burden strategic and economic 
interests impose on U.S. quest to 
effective response to military 
dictatorships and human rights 
abuses in Africa (Obiozor, 1994). 
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The international community 
pressurized the junta to free Abiola 
conduct fresh elections in which he 
would be free to recontest. Abacha‘s 
failure to heed all entreaties caused 
the violent protest at the end of 1995 
through 1998. The protests were 
nationwide, but were more multiple 
in the South-West, namely Ibadan, 
Lagos, Benin, Ilorin and Abeokuta. 
Political activists, anti-Abacha 
politicians, uncompromising student 
leaders, women leaders, journalists, 
etc, were arrested and detained.  
 
It was the very act of killing the 
Ogoni 9 that became the junta‘s 
Achilles‘ heels. According to Emeka 
Anyaoku, Commonwealth Secretary 
General during that time,                     
 
Things came to a head with 
the execution of Ken Saro-
Wiwa and his other eight 
Ogoni kinsmen in 
November 1995, an action 
that put the regime 
frontally at odds with the 
rest of the world, 
particularly the United 
Nations, the European 
Union and the 
Commonwealth. The 
Commonwealth in 
particular had to outright 
suspend Nigeria from its 
membership because it 
considered all of Abacha‗s 
conduct a gross violation 
of its 1991 Harare 
Declaration of 
Commonwealth Principles 
(Josiah, 2008). 
 
Also, Canada, a leading nation that 
led the movement against the 
hanging of the Ogoni 9, took the first 
major step of freezing relations with 
Nigeria. It closed its diplomatic 
mission in Lagos and recalled its 
staff, while the US imposed more 
military sanctions on the country, 
threatened to declare top military and 
junta personnel persona non grata in 
US, and went ahead to cancel direct 
flights between New York and 
Lagos. Britain, leading a group of 
Commonwealth powers including 
South Africa, limited diplomatic 
relations with Nigeria (Meier, 2002). 
 
By the indefinite suspension of the 
Commonwealth of Nations and other 
diplomatic moves made to isolate 
Abacha the country suffered severe 
economic downturn. Aside its oil, 
other sources of revenue were 
blocked. Technology in-flow and 
products from the west were brought 
in with much effort, which led to the 
sliding of the naira value in the 
world market. Petroleum products 
thus became scarce and expensive as 
trade and commerce within the 
global economy had become 
impaired. Save for France with with 
which General Sani Abacha enjoyed 
economic relationship (Olarewaju, 
1999:50-120), the Nigerian economy 
nearly lost touch with the western 
market. 
 
Its pariah status notwithstanding, the 
military administration as it would 
later show sponsored state violence 
secretly, assassinating the active crop 
of the nation‘s democrats. In a 
desperate bid to acquire some false 
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legitimacy a lot of money was spent 
on pro-Abacha rallies. The only five 
registered political parties also all 
held their national convention at 
which, they, one after the other 
adopted General Abacha as their 
consensus presidential candidate. 
Completely disillusioned with the 
political development in Nigeria, 
European nations mounted economic 
pressure on the country, imposing 
more sanctions and in some cases, 
severing diplomatic relations with it 
(Meier, 2002). 
 
Abacha‘s administration carried on 
the job of foreign policy in a most 
pedestrian manner. While the 
intrigues at home and his 
international problems made him to 
lose foreign policy direction and 
misdirect the country‘ policy 
objective, Abacha‘s idea of foreign 
policy, it seemed was to earn more 
enemies for Nigeria. Nigeria was 
embarrassed several times by this 
approach, which by all means was 
‗area boy‘ diplomacy, as Fawole 
(2004) and some other scholars have 
noted. Abacha challenged the world 
to mind its business by asking them 
that Nigeria‘s problems at the time 
were entirely Nigerian affairs, which 
should not concern the international 
community. Hence, Nigeria‘s foreign 
policy objective rather attracted 
bitter resentment from overseas and 
generated greater unease and 
disaffection at home. 
 
However, Nigeria under Abacha 
fared well in its in its peacekeeping 
efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
The ECOWAS Peace Monitoring 
Group (ECOMOG) got Nigeria‘s 
maximum support to end the civil 
wars in those countries. An 
achievement for General Abacha was 
that Nigeria was able to use 
ECOMOG to end the wars in Liberia 
and supervise an election in which 
Charles Taylor, former rebel leader, 
emerged as Liberia‘s President 
(Mazrui, 2006). 
 
The alleged coups of 1995 and 1997 
in which prominent Nigerians, 
including General Olusegun 
Obasanjo, Shehu Musa Yar-Adua 
and Abacha‘s deputy, General 
Oladipo Diya were indicted and 
consequently jailed attracted more 
international condemnation and 
isolation for Nigeria. The general 
feeling was that the two coups were 
arranged to frame and eliminate 
Abacha‘s perceived obstacles to his 
presidential bid. The death in prison 
of General Yar‘Adua in 1997 further 
caused more global disaffection 
towards Nigeria and its elimination 
from the group of dignified world 
nations (Olarewaju, 1999). 
 
Abdusalami’s Foreign Policy: 
Change or Continuity? 
Abubakar‘s regime was a very short 
one. During both the Abacha and 
Abubakar eras, Nigeria's main 
decision-making organ was the 
exclusively military Provisional 
Ruling Council (PRC) which 
governed by decree. The PRC 
oversaw the 32-member federal 
executive council composed of 
civilians and military officers. 
Pending the promulgation of the 
constitution written by the 
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Constitutional Conference in 1995, 
the government observed some 
provisions of the 1979 and 1989 
constitutions. Neither Abacha nor 
Abubakar lifted the decree 
suspending the 1979 constitution, 
and the 1989 constitution was not 
implemented. The judiciary's 
authority and independence was 
significantly impaired during the 
Abacha era by the military regime's 
arrogation of judicial power and 
prohibition of court review of its 
action. The court system continued 
to be hampered by corruption and 
lack of resources after Abacha's 
death. In an attempt to alleviate such 
problems, Abubakar's government 
implemented a civil service pay raise 
and other reforms (US State Dept, 
2008).  
 
In August 1998, the Abubakar 
government appointed the 
Independent National Electoral 
Commission (INEC) to conduct 
elections for local government 
councils, state legislatures and 
governors, the National Assembly, 
and president. INEC held a series of 
four successive elections between 
December 1998 and February 1999 
(US Dept. of State, 2008).                .   
The PRC promulgated a new 
constitution, based largely on the 
suspended 1979 constitution, before 
the May 29, 1999 inauguration of the 
new civilian president. The 
constitution included provisions for a 
bicameral legislature, the National 
Assembly, consisting of a 360-
member House of Representatives 
and a 109-member Senate. The 
executive branch and the office of 
president retained strong federal 
powers. The legislature and 
judiciary, having suffered years of 
neglect, are finally rebuilding as 
institutions and beginning to exercise 
their constitutional roles in the 
balance of power (Ameh, 2008).  
 
In terms of foreign policy and 
Nigeria‘s external relations, General 
Abdusalami Abubakar met a 
declining power and image of 
Nigeria, engendered by a combative 
foreign policy of Abacha. The 
regime had, by this time, isolated 
itself from and had been further 
ostracized by the international 
community. Hence, the first task of 
General Abubakar was to overhaul 
the foreign ministry and set out a 
new policy agenda that would carry 
Nigeria out of its dwindling 
international fortunes. Abubakar 
confirmed this in his Budget of 
Realism in 1999, viz: 
 
This administration will 
continue to pursue its policy of 
constructive engagement with 
other members of the 
international community. We 
are committed to ensuring that 
Nigeria takes its rightful place 
among the comity of nations 
based on the principles of 
mutual respect and protection 
of our national interest. We 
…hope the international 
community will continue to 
support Nigeria at this critical 
stage … not only in ensuring 
the successful implementation 
of our political transition but 
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also our economic reform 
programs (Abdusalami, 1999).  
 
Abubakar began the process of 
reintegrating Nigeria in the global 
system by going on trips to world‘s 
leading democracies namely, USA, 
Britain, France and South Africa. He 
had visited South Africa earlier, and 
reached Cotonou and Lome for talks 
on bilateral relations. In the UK, 
Tony Blair and Abubakar reached 
agreements on the transition 
programme and economic reforms in 
Nigeria. Abubakar also met British 
industrialists and businessmen with 
whom he also struck new business 
deals for Nigeria. President Bill 
Clinton had discussions with the 
Nigerian government on issues of 
human rights, rule of law and the 
democratization process in Nigeria. 
France insisted that the repressive 
laws, particularly Decree 2 of 1984 
be repealed and political detainees 
released (Taiwo, 1998:18). 
 
During Abubakar‘s tours of the UK, 
London-based international human 
rights groups impressed it on the 
British government to prevail on the 
Abubakar government to resolve the 
outstanding human rights issues in 
Nigeria. Peter Takiramibiodde, 
Malcolm Smart and Eno Usua asked 
that journalists, politicians and other 
democracy activists arrested and 
detained by the past Nigeria 
government be released. Another 
group lampooned Nigeria for not 
accepting the proposal for the 
convocation of Sovereign National 
Conference (SNC) or the forming of 
the Government of National Unity 
(Taiwo, 1998:20). 
 
Abubakar‘s major objectives for the 
sojourn were to convince the world 
that a genuine transition to civil rule 
was on course, and that a process of 
national reconciliation at home had 
commenced. His declaration that 
elections would start in December, 
1998 with the local government polls 
and terminate in February, 1999 with 
the National Assembly and 
Presidential elections were heart-
warming to the international 
community. Addressing the 53rd 
session of the United nations General 
Assembly in New York, Abubakar 
declared, 
 
I do not intend to run for any 
office. I do not belong to any 
party. Every serving soldier is 
going to return to the 
barracks… Our people are 
determined to ensure that a 
sustainable democratic 
government is established in 
the country (Abubakar, 
1999b).  
 
Aside the fact that it is an expensive 
venture, it is the kind of government 
that encourages an atmosphere of 
liberty or freedom and an auspicious 
clime for market economy to grow 
within a social space. Abubakar 
discussed Nigeria‘s debt burden with 
the US, averring that a burdening 
economy should not be bequeathed 
unto a nascent democracy. President 
Clinton promised relief for Nigeria‘s 
$28 billion debt, but reiterated that 
sanctions on Nigeria would remain 
until an elected president was sworn 
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in. US sanctions included limiting 
military sales to Nigeria, restricting 
visas for Nigerian officials and 
banning of air links between Nigeria 
and the US (Awowede, 1998; Meier, 
2000). 
 
Back home, the Nigerian 
government attempted reforms. 
Abubakar released some political 
detainees, including former head of 
state General Olusegun Obasanjo, 
Bola Ige, Olabiyi  Durojaiye, Beko 
Ransom-Kuti, Frank Kokori, 
President of Nigeria‘s petroleum 
transporters‘ union, Christie 
Anyanwu, a renown female 
journalist and Niran Malaolu, editor 
of the Diet newspapers. He also 
began probe into the alleged looting 
of the country‘s treasury by the 
Abacha family, recovering in the 
first instance, a whooping $727 
million and inviting former Abacha 
top aides for questioning (Taiwo, 
1998). 
 
Again Abubakar freed himself from 
the process of party formation and 
electoral process. This paved way for 
a free and fair electoral process that 
boosted the country‘s international 
image. He also recognized the 
multiplier effects of the shortage of 
petroleum products at the time and 
vowed to nip in the bud, the 
problems of fuel scarcity, unstable 
supply of electricity and 
communications services, with a 
view to reviving the economy 
(Taiwo, 1998: 20). 
 
But the economy was far from being 
revived, with the country‘s foreign 
reserves even sliding from $7 billion 
to $3 billion, the prices of oil 
products soaring from #11 per litre to 
#20 despite their recrudescent 
importation and scarcity, and the 
minimum wage crisis wreaking its 
own havoc on the economy. On the 
political scene, Abubakar did not 
release immediately the winner of 
the controversial June 12 1993 
presidential election, M. K. O. 
Abiola and several other political 
detainees detained by the Abacha 
junta. Also controversially left 
unreleased were Abacha‘s former 
loyalists who Abacha himself had 
framed in the coup of 1997. 
Abubakar‘s political re-engineering 
did not also take into consideration 
the agitations for SNC and GNU 
(Oyinlola, 1998: 14). 
 
These fuelled resentment and doubts 
from social crusaders. Constitutional 
lawyer, Gani Fawehinmi expressed 
doubts in Abubakar‘s transitional 
agenda, saying, ―anybody who 
believes in the transition programme 
must have his head examined by a 
qualified and experienced 
psychiatrist.‖ Abubakar‘s broadcast 
in July 1998 further indicated that his 
administration was not interested in 
the issues of equal citizenship, 
internal decolonization, true 
federalism and the GNU. The United 
Action for Democracy (UAD), 
posited Abubakar‘s disposition was 
―arrogant and unrepentant‖ and a 
―brazen relegation of the popular 
demands of the people.‖ Abubakar‘s 
assumed brazen relegation of the 
people was followed by the 
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agitations from the South-West for 
the creation of Oduduwa State, the 
establishment of Radio Biafra in the 
South-east transmitting on 154.60 
megahertz at 19 metre band 
shortwave from Washington DC, 
USA and the emergence of the Odua 
Peoples Congress (OPC). There were 
also insinuations that the US and UK 
were secretly backing Abubakar not 
to make too many concessions and 
that even the death of Abiola was 
engineered by Western conspirators 
and their Nigerian government 
accomplices to end the June 12 crisis 
once and for all (Ojebisi:1998:15-
16). 
 
The visits of UN‘s Secretary-
General, Kofi Anan and 
Commonwealth‘s scribe Emeka 
Anyaoku, were exploited by the 
Abubakar government to earn 
international goodwill. Anan was 
allowed to meet Moshood Abiola. 
But the death of Abiola in July 1998, 
during the visit of the US Under-
Secretary of Foreign Affairs. 
Thomas Pickering, few days after 
shook the world and further caused 
national crisis. 
 
But the junta‘s transition received a 
major boost in 1999 when Abubakar 
released more detainees, including 
General Oladipo Diya and other 
alleged 1997 coup plotters. The 
release and smooth transition process 
prompted the home-coming of 
Nigeria‘s prominent exiles, some of 
who came to participate in the 
electoral process. Also gratifying to 
the international community was the 
successful hosting of the World 
Youth Soccer Championship 
(Nigeria ‘99) which further endeared 
the government to the world. The 
FIFA nod was in itself an indication 
of vote of confidence on Nigeria 
once again and that meant it had 
been socio-politically re-integrated 
in the world system. 
 
Abubakar‘s government became 
popular for its economic and 
political reforms. America‘s 
Secretary of State, Madeleine 
Albright (cited in Oladeinde, 2000:9) 
confirmed this in a remark on the 
attitude of Abubakar after they had 
met in Washington, 
 
I had a chance to reiterate 
our great pleasure with the 
remarkable progress that he 
has made in a very short 
period of time in restoring 
Nigeria‘s international 
standing… we have a great 
respect for the people of 
Nigeria and wish to be of 
assistance however we Can 
(Albright, in Oladeinde, 
2000).      
 
General Abubakar (cited in 
Oladeinde, 2000:9) declared why his 
administration took decisive steps in 
its domestic and foreign policies,      
 
My administration was 
acutely aware of the heavy, 
dark clouds in the air which 
were only but ominous and 
imminent prelude to 
potentially destructive storms 
that portended a mortal threat 
to the ship of the Nigerian 
nation. We knew we had a 
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historic responsibility to get 
our bearings right and move 
very fast, to avoid ship wreck 
(Abdusalami, in Oladeinde, 
2000: 9). 
 
He further said his interactions with 
the superpowers were boosted by the 
countries‘ willingness to open up 
with Nigeria once again in the 
interest of ―their own countries as 
well as for Nigeria.‖ 
 
Nigeria’s Economic Diplomacy 
In the Budget of Realism of 1999, 
General Abubakar vowed to pursue 
an economic diplomacy that would 
―mobilize the support of the 
international community for 
Nigeria‘s policy reform.‖ He also 
declared that Nigeria would 
faithfully operate its economy within 
the framework of the ECOWAS 
trade liberalization scheme so as to 
eliminate trade barriers, including 
taxes and levies, but which would 
not be to the detriment of the 
country‘s manufactured goods. Due 
to ―resource constraints,‖ Nigeria set 
aside 1.5 billion dollars for external 
servicing for 1999 as against 2 
billion dollars it used to gulp 
hitherto. The country‘s foreign 
reserves having dropped from 9 
billion dollars to 3 million dollars, 
the Nigerian government sought to 
appeal to international financial 
institutions to assist in reducing the 
country‘s debts. Negotiations were 
opened up with the Paris Club, 
Bretton Woods and other creditors to 
seek debt reduction or relief. During 
his talks with the British authorities, 
US, France and other countries, 
Nigeria sought debt cancellation or 
at worst reduction. Debt conversion 
was also sought. This was a vehicle 
for debt reduction as it meant 
creditor-nations would have a leeway 
to invest in the country. 
Interestingly, embargo on external 
borrowing was also lifted. The 
embargo imposed in 1994 was on 
concessionary and project-tied loans 
and credits (Oladeinde, 2000:9).  
 
Expectedly, Nigeria‘s aggressive 
drive for debt reduction and renewed 
external borrowing was a paradox 
that rubbed on the country‘s 
economy. First was the sliding of the 
Naira in the exchange market and the 
attendant deregulation of the oil 
sector. Second, this resulted in cheap 
prices of Nigeria‘s crude oil in the 
world market, which escalated 
shortage of foreign earnings and 
dwindling external reserves 
(Oyinlola, 1998:14). Much funding 
had to go to into the oil sector as 
petroleum products were imported in 
large quantities, and 
earnings/revenue from that sector 
was all-time low considering the 
huge expenditure and yet the losses 
in attempt to get debt reduction and 
more loans. 
 
Sino-Nigeria Economic Relations 
The Abubakar administration met a 
strong Sino-Nigeria ties. The belief 
by Abacha in a strong ties with 
China was boosted by his conviction 
that the only way for him to maintain 
a power balance and a political 
leverage in the international 
community, where he had lost so 
much goodwill was to befriend an 
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eastern Socialist power. Also, he 
needed military leverage 
characteristic of dictators to 
perpetuate his stronghold and 
suppress internal opposition. Since 
the west would not provide him with 
such, Abacha sought China‘s 
assistance. It is noteworthy that 
China was at the time, also a country 
with a poor human rights record, its 
government using threat and 
coercion to foist a brutish rule on 
civil-society. It is pertinent to note 
that Abacha also made friends with 
traditional enemies of the west- 
Libya, Iraq, Sudan and Afghanistan. 
 
China was considered a veritable 
nation with which to do business. 
Contracts for roads and railways 
reconstruction were awarded to 
Chinese companies. Also, China sold 
arms and ammunition to Nigeria 
regularly. China was also given the 
contract to produce military trucks 
for Nigeria. For instance, the China 
National Heavy Duty Truck 
Corporation, in collaboration with 
Steyr, a trucks-manufacturing 
company in Bauchi, began the 
production of the famous 1291 and 
1491 truck modes. The Abacha 
administration had sent a military 
delegation headed by General 
Abubakar himself, then the Chief of 
Defense Staff to China on tour. 
Abubakar toured China‘s military 
formations, units and institutions in 
Beijing, Nanjing and Shanghai and 
inspected military drills and 
demonstrations by the Chinese army 
for lessons for the Nigerian army. 
Sino-Nigeria defence agreements 
were reached between Abubakar‘s 
team and Chinese Premier, Li Peng, 
Defence Minister, General Chi 
Haotian and liberation Army Chief, 
General Fu Quanyou. China was at 
the time, between Abacha‘s last days 
and Abubakar‘s emergence as the 
country‘s ruler, infamous for fuelling 
tension in Asia. It assisted Pakistan, 
a country at diplomatic-military 
loggerheads with its immediate 
neighbor, India, in developing a 
nuclear reactor and a plutonium 
reprocessing facility. In May 1998, 
India and Pakistan began a nuclear 
race as both carried out a number of 
tests to determine mutual capabilities 
(Tell, 1998:21). 
 
The Abubakar administration did not 
cancel the contracts awarded to 
Chinese companies under Abacha, 
nor severe military links with it. 
Neither were the anomalies replete in 
the Nigeria-China relations 
addressed. Bank vaults of Abacha 
politicians and defense contractors 
allegedly in China and Hon Kong 
were for instance, not investigated 
(Tell, 1998: 22). 
 
The China Civil Engineering 
Construction Company (CCECC), an 
integral part of the Chinese 
government was, during the Abacha 
regime, given the contract to 
refurbish and overhaul the Nigerian 
railways. Ironically, back in China, 
its railway system was being 
overhauled by German and Japanese 
companies. The CCECC contract, 
misnomer as it seemed, went on 
under the Abubakar administration. 
To this extent, substandard railway 
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equipment and facilities were 
imported from China and little 
surprise it was, that the Nigeria 
railway system remained moribund 
and non-functional for the better part 
of the Abubakar regime (Bukarambe, 
2005). 
 
The Chinese government itself was 
unwilling to allow its ties with 
Nigeria go sour. It was ever 
anticipatory of matching the US in 
the lifting of Nigeria‘s crude oil and 
so, did not cease in giving agro-
economic and educational aides to 
Nigeria in order to make the pre-
Abubakar agreement continually 
relevant. Being a product of the 
Abacha regime itself, the Abubakar 
government kept upholding the 
content of the former relations 
(Chibundu, 2000). 
 
It is therefore pertinent to submit that 
the Abubakar administration 
changed little in Nigeria‘s low 
ranking in the world because of the 
low times of its foreign policy during 
the twilight of the Babangida regime 
and the reign of Abacha. Abdusalami 
sustained much of what his 
predecessor had engineered and his 
pacification abroad constituted a 
manifestation of the low times for 
Nigeria‘s international standing. It 
was a marked departure from old 
when Nigeria stood tall in the globe.  
 
Continuity in Foreign Policy 
Thrust 
Nigeria‘s foreign policy thrust has, in 
theory and practice, remained pro-
Africa. It also goes pari passu with 
its international relations objectives. 
Nigeria under Abacha and 
Abdulsalami was very active in 
joining multi-national military forces 
to defuse tension in conflict-ridden 
areas of Africa and the world. This 
was in continuation of the principles 
and fundamentals of Nigeria‘s 
foreign policy. Nigeria had 
unilaterally quelled the southern 
Cameroon crisis and the Nigeria-
Cameroon border conflicts of 1960-
61. The country also played a part in 
containing the Somalian crisis, the 
Middle East conflicts, and the crises 
in Eastern Europe of the 1990s. 
During the Babangida regime, 
Nigeria committed billions of dollars 
into the Liberian civil crisis. The 
formation of the ECOWAS 
monitoring group (ECOMOG) was 
Nigeria‘s initiative and the peace-
keeping force continued in the 
Abacha regime. Abacha bankrolled 
the ECOMOG ventures in Sierra 
Leone in the wake of a civil war 
there. General Abubakar committed 
human, material and financial 
resources into the Sierra Leone crisis 
more than the previous ECOMOG 
experiences in war-torn areas of the 
sub-region. Put together, Nigeria had 
committed over 250,000 soldiers in 
peace-keeping operations since 1960, 
which is more than the entire size of 
its armed forces (Uwalaka, 1999). 
 
General Abubakar (cited in 
Uwalaka,1999), represented by this 
wife at the Africa First Ladies Peace 
Mission meeting in Abuja on May 
10, 1999, however gave reasons for 
his government‘s commitment to 
international peace-keeping 
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(including monitoring, observing, 
enforcement, etc). He lamented the 
spate of wars and conflicts in Africa, 
which had claimed millions of lives 
and property, and which had created 
a major refugee problem. Six million 
refugee and 18 million displaced 
persons were at the time, all over 
Africa. He said, 
 
Nearly 40 years after 
independence and the 
establishment of the OAU, 
it is time for Africa to take 
its destiny in its hands, it is 
time for us to take 
responsibility for our own 
mistakes and move 
vigorously to correct them 
(Abdusalami, in Uwalaka, 
1999). 
 
Nigeria‘s presence in Sierra Leone 
cost 3 million dollars per day, which 
was four times Sierra Leone‘s annual 
budget. A breakdown of the 
expenditure on soldiers showed that 
aside the numerous cases of ‗ghost 
soldiers‘ whose allowances went into 
officers‘ pockets, the commanding 
officers opted to keep records of 
dead soldiers away from Abuja, so as 
to keep receiving the dead soldiers‘ 
allowances on their behalf. In spite 
of the huge spending, Nigerian 
soldiers still suffered deprivations 
and hunger-induced deaths. This not 
only weakened the morale of new 
recruits for Sierra Leonean mission, 
but raised fears of mutiny in the 
Nigerian barracks. The Nigerian 
officials decided to cajole the 
volunteers that there were good 
allowances and insurance scheme 
sponsored by Britain, US and 
Canada for each soldier (Seminitari, 
1999:26). 
 
The Abubakar government embarked 
on international trips soliciting 
money to maintain its ECOMOG 
contingent. Ignatius Olisemeka, the 
External Affairs Minister, got 
promises of $2 million worth of 
logistics support from the UK in the 
fund drive. Also a total of $13 
million in contract was got as 
contributions from the US and UK in 
1998 for ECOMOG operations. The 
contracts were even awarded to a US 
company, PAE (Seminitari, 1996:26) 
 
 Nigeria‘s foreign policy 
commitment to the civil war in Sierra 
Leone was a major pre-occupation in 
its international relations. This is 
understandable in view of the fact 
that Nigeria was transiting into 
democracy and wanted other 
democratizing African countries 
along, particularly threatened 
democracies like Sierra Leone. The 
restoration of Tejan Kabba‘s 
administration by Abacha 
notwithstanding, Abubakar‘s 
military commitment was to guide 
and sustain that country‘s restored 
democracy and rid Sierra Leone of 
the remnants of anti-Kabbah rebels. 
It was argued at the 1999 ECOWAS 
summit that it was pertinent to retain 
ECOMOG to forestall future military 
interruptions or rebellion that might 
again lead to civil war in West 
Africa. ECOMOG was thus 
supposed to be a kind of West 
African high command or standing 
army. 
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General Abubakar also played 
mediating role in the Congo 
Kinshasa crisis in which rebels 
opposed to President Laurent 
Kabila‘s government continued to 
push into the capital with aerial 
bombardments of non-combatants 
communities. This is a role 
Abubakar still plays as the UN‘s 
Special Envoy in Congo. 
 
Conclusion 
General Abubakar‘s approach may 
have played Nigeria down as a 
honourable and respectable member 
of the international community, it 
however brought the world to 
understanding that the nation as a 
whole wanted to make progress in its 
relationship with others. The Abacha 
regime had caused much damage 
which would require a restarting 
from the beginning. The 
reconstruction process would imply 
ample humbling disposition by 
Nigeria to its counterparts in the 
global system. No wonder, General 
Abdusalami Abubakar routinely 
made pleas in the public to the world 
to ―forgive and forget‖. 
Abdulsalami‘s approach may be 
reminiscent of Chamberlain‘s weak 
and terse response in the face of 
German aggression, but it sure 
guaranteed Nigeria‘s re-entry into 
global reckoning. Nigeria re-
integrated in the world community 
and recognized again as the giant of 
Africa. Positive results were yielded 
as national powers such as the US, 
Britain, France, Germany, Canada, 
South Africa and Netherlands began 
to reopen their doors for Nigeria: its 
head of state, ministers, other top 
officials and citizens. The acceptance 
by FIFA to have Nigeria host the 
1999 world youth football 
championship was indicative of the 
international recognition and 
acknowledgement of the transition 
process in the country, and the 
passing of vote of confidence on the 
progressive government. 
 
Canada, which had severed 
diplomatic ties with Nigeria during 
the Ogoni crisis, restored links when 
it sent a delegation to Nigeria to 
reopen diplomatic talks on how to 
normalize Canada–Nigeria relations. 
The visits of UN‘s Kofi Anan, 
Commonwealth‘s Emeka Anyaoku 
and US‘ Thomas Pickering in quick 
successions in 1998 were a measure 
of Nigeria‘s reintegration in the 
global community. 
 
Exiles returned shortly after all other 
―phantom‖ coup plotters and 
political detainees had been released. 
They included Wole Soyinka, Dan 
Suleiman, Bola Tinubu, Tokunbo 
Afikuyomi etc., just as the repeal of 
the obnoxious Decree 2 of 1984 got 
local and international appraisal. 
 
To what extent, however, was 
Nigeria‘s image crisis remedied? The 
Abubakar administration was 
accused of gross mismanagement of 
public funds as his government was 
even accused of siphoning billions of 
petrodollars allegedly shared among 
his lieutenants. Oil lifting and 
licenses were also reportedly 
arbitrarily and fraudulently given to 
Abubakar‘s loyalists just as jumbo 
43 
     Covenant University Journal of Politics and International Affairs (CUJPIA) Vol. 1, No. 1 (Maiden Edition), June, 2013 
 
contracts running into several 
millions of dollars were also 
awarded within a period of five 
months. Furthermore, choice-lands, 
properties and house allowances 
were allocated to past rulers and old 
loyalists just as insinuations arose 
that the Abacha loots recovered were 
shared among government 
functionaries (Awowede, 1998). 
 
Moreover, corruption still pervaded 
high places and Nigeria‘s image 
problem exacerbated by the 
perpetration of advance fee fraud 
(419) by syndicates persisted under 
the dispensation. The Transparency 
International (TI),a global non- 
governmental organization ranked 
Nigeria as the second most corrupt 
nation in the world during this 
period. The Abubakar administration 
thus failed to use Nigeria‘s foreign 
policy to launder Nigeria‘s image 
well, like the Obasanjo 
administration is presently doing.
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